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The Defendants/Appellants Jay Timmons & Associates, Jay Timmons, and
Marshall McDaniel ("Defendants") submit the following petition for a rehearing.
ISSUE PRESENTED BY PETITION
Does this Court have discretion to deny the Defendants attorney's fees specifically
provided for in the restrictive covenants at issue in this matter?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In footnote 6 concluding the opinion rendered in this matter, the Court indicated
that because it was reversing the trial court's decision in favor of the Plaintiffs, it was also
reversing the award of attorney's fees in Plaintiffs' favor. The Court indicated, however,
that each side would bear its own litigation expenses. Defendants, who have prevailed in
this matter, cannot escape the conclusion that the Court's ruling prevents the recovery of
attorney's fees incurred by them both at trial and on appeal. Defendants respectfully
submit that under Utah law, the Defendants are entitled as a matter of law to reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in the trial court and on appeal. Accordingly, Defendants
respectfully request that the Court revise footnote six to provide for the recovery of
attorney's fees by the Defendants both in the trial court and on appeal, and remand to
the trial court for a determination of what amount of fees is reasonable in this case.
FACTS
Plaintiffs sued the Defendants for alleged violations of the provisions of the
recorded Evergreen Subdivision Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions
("CC&Rs"). The case was tried to a jury, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
Defendants on every allegation. The judge subsequently determined that the jury verdict
was advisory. While he agreed with the jury that the Defendants did not violate certain

provisions of the CC&R's, be concluded that other provisions of the CC&Rs were
violated. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on certain allegations and
awarded the Plaintiffs $35,000.00 in attorney's fees.
On appeal, this Court concluded that the judge erred as a matter of law in
deeming the jury verdict to be advisory and non-binding. The Court reversed and
remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with the jury verdict. The Court's decision
has the undisputed effect of making the Defendants the prevailing party on every issue.
Notwithstanding, the Court ruled that the Defendants are not entitled to recover the
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter, despite the fact that the CC&R's at
issue expressly provide that M[a]ny judgment rendered in any action or proceeding
pursuant hereto shall include a sum for attorney's fees in an amount as the court shall
deem reasonable, in favor of the prevailing party."
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S
FEES AS A MATTER OF LAW

While footnote 6 of the Court's opinion appears to conclude that this Court has
discretion to refuse to award attorney's fees provided by contract to a prevailing party, the
Defendants respectfully suggest that no such discretion exists when fees are provided for
by contract rather than statute. Indeed, Utah case law establishes that the recovery of
fees when provided for by contract is a matter of legal right.
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Courts have held that provisions in restrictive covenants providing for the recovery of
attorneys fees are contractual in nature and have applied the rules applicable to contractual
provisions. See, e.g.,Amoco Realty Company v. Montalbano, 478 N.E.2d 860,865-866 (IlLApp.
2d. 1985). Utah courts have held that restrictive covenants are contracts and should be
interpreted and treated as such. See Cecala -• /'\>r/ey, 764 P.2d 643, 644 (Utfch App. 1988).

In addition, the Court should allow Defendants to also recover their fees on
appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly declared:
We therefore adopt the rule of law that a provision for payment of
attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to
enforce the contract, and overrule Swain and Downey State Bank insofar as
they may be to the contrary.
Management Services, Inc. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980)
(emphasis added); see also, Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah App. 1989).
Thus, it is clear that Defendants are entitled to recover not only reasonable attorney's
fees incurred in the trial court, but also reasonable fees expended on appeal. In the
words of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, the Defendants are entitled to recover
their attorney's fees in this case as a "matter of legal right" and to deny them fees in a
reasonable amount constitutes a "mistake of law." Accordingly, this court should revise
footnote 6 and remand this case to the trial court with direction to determine reasonable
fees incurred by the Defendant at trial and on appeal.
II.

NO EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST THAT WOULD
JUSTIFY REFUSAL TO ENFORCE THE CLEAR PROVISION OF
THE CC&R'S PROVIDING FOR RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

In Cobabe, this court noted in dicta that in "extraordinary circumstances" some
courts have declined to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in spite of an
enforceable contractual provision. Id. at 836 n.3. Notwithstanding its footnote 3, the
Cobabe court reversed the trial court's denial of fees based on a contractual provision.
The court gave three examples of cases constituting extraordinary circumstances. The
first, Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976), the only Utah case Defendants have
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another to deny prevailing defendants, forced to retain counsel to defend themselves,
their fees, particularly when the CC&R's Plaintiffs sue under clearly provide that the
prevailing party shall recover its attorney's fees in an action to enforce the CC&R's.
Article VI, Section 1(a) of the CC&R's provides:
Breach of any of the covenants contained in this Declaration and the
continuation of any such breach may be enjoined, by the Declarant, any
Owner or by the Architectural Committee. Any judgment rendered in any
action or proceeding pursuant hereto shall include a sum for attorney's fees
in an amount as the court shall deem reasonable, in favor of the prevailing
party ....
It is beyond dispute that this action was one to enforce the CC&R's and that the
Defendants were the prevailing party. Plaintiffs were well aware of the attorney's fees
provision when they decided to file a lawsuit. Notwithstanding, they determined to press
forward with litigation. Indeed, Plaintiffs made a request for and were awarded attorney's
fees based on the provision in the by the trial court CC&R's. No extraordinary
circumstances exist which justify a denial of the Appellant's attorney's fees in this case.2
CONCLUSION
Because it is a mistake of law to refuse to award attorney's fees provided for by
contract, this Court should revise footnote 6 of its opinion and remand to the trial court

2

The only "extraordinary circumstance" in this case appears to be that it was a close case
on the evidence. The jury decided the case one way, the judge another. However, close
cases cannot constitute extraordinary circumstances. To so conclude would render
contractual attorney's fees provisions a nullity in virtually all cases that go to trial. Virtually
every case that proceeds to trial is a close case-otherwise it would have settled or been
dismissed. Thus, the Court here should not deny Defendants' request because the case may
have been close. The establishment of such a precedent will only encourage protracted
battles over attorney's fees.
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for a determination of reasonable fees incurred by the Defendants at trial and on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ £ day of June, 1995.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Paul H^Matthew^
Randy W. Austin
Attorneys for Defebdcints-Appellants
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